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ARRESTING A SUSPECT IN THE HOME OF A
THIRD PARTY: THE ISSUE OF
STANDING OR LEGITIMATE
EXPECTATIONS OF PRIVACY
EDWARD

I.

G.

MASCOLO·

INTRODUCTION

In Sleagald v. Uniled Slales,1 the United States Supreme Court
reaffirmed the preeminence of privacy interests in the home.. The
Court held that absent either exigent circumstances or valid consent,
law enforcement officials may not search for the subject of an arrest
warrant in the residence of a third party without first obtaining a
search warrant. 2
Because this additional requirement of a search warrant un
doubtedly will create prac!ical problems for the police and the
courts, the rule of law established in Sleagald may be honored more
in its breach than in its observance. For example, if the police are
prohibited from intruding upon the privacy interests of a third-party
homeowner without the authorization conferred by a search warrant,
they still may accomplish their quest for the subject, buttressed by
probable cause presence. The police then may conduct a valid inci
dental search of the subject or a plain view seizure. In Sleagald, the
Court stated that entry without authority of a search warrant may be
justified under a claim of exigent circumstances. 3 But if an exigency
• Research attorney, Office of Judicial Education, Judicial Department, State of
Connecticut; member of the Connecticut and District of Columbia Bars; Editor-in-Chief
of the CONNECTICUT BAR JOURNAL, 1969-1973; member of the CONNECTICUT BAR
JOURNAL Editorial Board, 1968-1981; B.A., Wesleyan University, 1949; LL.B., Ge
orgetown University, 1952. The opinions expressed herein are those of the author alone.
I. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
2. Id. at 213-16.
3. Id. at 213. This situation may arise with some frequency. See, e.g., United
States v. Williams, 612 F.2d 735, 737, 739 (3d Cir. 1979), cerro denied, 445 U.S. 934
(1980); Virgin Islands V. Gereau, 502 F.2d 914, 928-29 (3d Cir. 1974), cerl. denied,420
U.S. 909 (1975); Fisher V. Volz, 496 F.2d 333,336-37,344-45 (3d Cir. 1974); Lankford V.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197, 199-200, 201-02 (4th Cir. 1966) (en banc). Moreover, probable
cause evidence of guilt sufficient for the issuance of an arrest warrant is not legally sy
nonymous with probable cause evidence of situs. See Fisher V. Volz, 496 F.2d at 341; 2
W. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH AMENDMENT § 6.1, at
381
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claim fails, a court will be left with the issue whether the subject of
an arrest warrant has the right to invoke the privacy benefit of a
search warrant in the residence of a third party.
Although Steagald required a search warrant, it did not address
the right of the subject to insist upon the warrant. The question of a
subject's privacy rights in a third-party residence will confront a
court if the subject of an arrest warrant moves to suppress evidence
seized without benefit of a search warrant. This question, which im
plicates the separate privacy interests of the subject and the home
owner and the invocation of the exclusionary rule,4 will be the focus
of this article. While narrowly drawn, it is an issue which is impor
tant to the administration of the criminal justice system. 5
Before analyzing the right of the subject of an arrest warrant to
claim the benefit of a search warrant in the home of a third party,
this article first will review the requirements for standing to invoke
the protections of the fourth amendment. 6 The rationale of Steagald
then will be analyzed, with particular emphasis upon the separate
privacy interests of the subject and the homeowner. The article will
conclude that, as the separation of privacy concerns precludes the
subject of an arrest warrant from invoking the requirement of a
search warrant in the third-party residence, the courts should not re
384 (1978). Thus, at the time the police apply for an arrest warrant, they may not possess
adequate information concerning the location or presence of the suspect to justify the
issuance of a search warrant. See Virgin Islands v. Gereau, 502 F.2d at 928-29. The
Third Circuit, in Gereau, recognized that "probable cause may exist to believe that a
suspect ... is in more than one location." Id. at 929. But this factor offieeting presence
will serve to both compound the difficulty of obtaining a valid search warrant and
heighten the reliance of the police upon exigent circumstances. Finally, the duration of
exigency itself may be so transitory as to be destroyed after the police have arrived to
effect an arrest and just prior to entry. Id.
For an analysis of warrantless arrest in the home under exigent circumstances, see
Donnino & Girese, Exigent Circumstances for a Warrantless Home Arrest, 45 ALB. L.
REV. 90 (1980); Mascolo, Emergency Arrest in the Home, 3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 387
(1981).
4. The exclusionary rule provides that evidence secured through an unlawful
search and seizure is inadmissable at trial. The exclusionary rule was established and
held applicable to federal criminal proceedings in Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383
(1914). Its application was extended to state proceedings in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643
(1961).
5. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 231 (1981) (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
6.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but ul'0n probable cause, supported by Oath or affirma
tion, and particularly descnbing the place to be searched, and the persons or
things to De seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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quire the presence of a search warrant in the event that entry under
exigent circumstances is rejected.
II.

CRITERIA FOR STANDING: LEGITIMATE EXPECTATIONS
OF PRIVACY

Standing embodies the right to be heard, that is, the right to
challenge police action. 7 Before an individual has standing to attach
the lawfulness of a search or seizure, he must show that his fourth
amendment privacy interests have been violated. If he makes the
requisite showing of a fourth amendment violation, he will be able to
exclude evidence gathered by law enforcement officers as "a means
for making effective the protection of privacy."8
The issue of standing, therefore, involves two inquiries: First,
whether the movant for suppression or exclusion has alleged an ac
tual injury to his interests and rights under the fourth amendment;9
and second, whether the movant has asserted his own interests and
rights "rather than basing his claim for relief upon the rights of third
parties."10 Because fourth amendment rights are personal rights that
cannot be asserted vicariously, II and because the protections secured
by the amendment are violated only when the challenged conduct
invades the legitimate expectations of privacy of the complainant
himself rather than those of a third party,12 the issue of standing will
not be considered distinct from the merits of a claimed infringement
7. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 137-40 (1978); Simmons v. United
States, 390 U.S. 377, 389-94 (1968); Mascolo, The Use at Trial of Suppression Hearing
Admissions: An Erosion of the Privilege Against Se!/-Incrimination, 72 DICK. L. REV. I,
30-31 (1967).
8. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 261 (1960).
9. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 139 (1978).
10. Id Accord, United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980).
II. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S.
223, 230 (1973); Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 174 (1969).
12. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980). This rule of restriction is so
entrenched in legal precedent and adhered to that it will not brook exception even in the
face of outrageous governmental conduct that shocks the conscience of the court under
the rubric of due process. See Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165, 172 (1952). Again, the
limitations of due process come into play only when the official activity in question vio
lates a personal right of the claimant. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. at 737 n.9.
Under the target theory, those against whom a police investigation is directed have
standing to object to an unreasonable search and seizure. Alderman v. United States,
394 U.S. 165,205-06 (1967) (Fortas, J., dissenting). Carried to its logical conclusion, the
target theory appears to sanction the vicarious assertion of fourth amendment rights. See
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 132-33, 135 (1978); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257,
261 (1960). See generally note 34 infra.
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of a defendant's fourth amendment guarantees. 13
In Jones v. United States, 14 the Supreme Court held that when
the government is prosecuting for illegal possession, standing is auto
matically conferred. The Court reasoned that to hold otherwise
would permit the prosecution to seek conviction for possession while
allowing the prosecution to block suppression of the seized evidence
by arguing that the defendant lacked the requisite possessory interest
to establish standing. 15 The Court stated that it refused to sanction
"such squarely contradictory assertions of power by the
Government." 16
The Jones Court offered a second rationale for the automatic
standing rule in possessory offenses. The Court recognized that to
require a person charged with a possessory offense to establish that
he was a victim of an invasion of privacy would place him on the
horns of a dilemmaY To establish a personal invasion of privacy,
the defendant must claim either that he owned or possessed the
seized property or that he had a substantial possessory interest in the
premises searched. 18 If, however, the defendant claimed ownership
or possession, he was faced with the possibility that his admission
could be used against him at trial on the issue of guilt. 19 Forced to
incriminate himself at the suppression hearing, the defendant, at the
very least, would be "placed in the criminally tendentious position of
explaining his possession of the premises."2o On the other hand, if
the defendant denied possession or ownership of the property or a
possessory interest in the premises, standing would not be conferred.
To avoid this, the Court noted that the defendant may be tempted to
perjure himself by claiming possession or ownership at the suppres
sion hearing while denying possession at trial,21 By eliminating the
necessity for a preliminary showing of an interest in the premises
searched or the property seized, the automatic standing rule allowed
the defendant to escape this dilemma. 22
Finally, in a separate basis for its decision, the Court observed
that ."[e]ven were this not a prosecution turning on illicit possession,
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
20.

Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 138-39 (1978).
362 U.S. 257 (1960).
Id. at 263-64.
Id. at 264.
Id. at 261-62.
Id. at 261.
Id. at 262.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 263.
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the legally requisite interest in the premises was here satis
fied. . . ."23 The Court held that if a defendant was "legitimately
on premises where ... [the] search [occurred he] may challenge its
legality by way of a motion to suppress, when its fruits are proposed
to be used against him."24
The persuasiveness of the dual rationale for the automatic
standing rule pronounced in Jones has been eroded by subsequent
Supreme Court decisions. Simmons v. United States 25 effectively un
dercut the self-incrimination justification by declaring that the sup
pression hearing testimony of a defendant could not be used against
him at trial on the issue of guilt "unless he makes no objection."26
In Rakas v. Illinois 27 and Rawlings v. Kentucky,28 the Court re
jected the primary holding in Jones that possession of seized evi
dence sufficient to establish criminal culpability also is sufficient to
establish standing. "[L]egal possession of a seized good is not a
proxy for determining whether the owner had a Fourth Amendment
interest for it does not invariably represent the protected Fourth
Amendment interest."29 The interest to be protected is that of a le
gitimate expectation of privacy in the area of the search. 30 Unless
such a breach of privacy can be demonstrated, ownership of, or a
possessory interest in, the items seized is not controlling on the issue
of standing. 3l Thus, the right to invoke the protections of the exclu
sionary rule is dependent upon whether the rights of the accused
have been violated by a particular search or seizure.32 Neither "a
possessory interest in the items seized,"33 nor the assertion that the
search is directed at the accused34 is sufficient to establish a protected
23. Id.
24. Id. at 267.

25. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
26. Id. at 394. Simmons represented a vindication of both the protection of pri
vacy conferred by the fourth amendment and the right to be free of compelled self-in
crimination secured by the fifth amendment. Id. at 393-94.
27. 439 U.S. 128 (1978).
28. 448 U.S. 98 (1980).
29. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91 (1980).
30. 448 U.S. at 104-06.
31. /d.; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 91-93 (1980). See 439 U.S. at 140,
143, 148-49.
32. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 87 n.4 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
133, 140 (1978).
33. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 93 (1980).
34. 439 U.S. at 132-38. Under the target theory, an accused invokes the protection
of the fourth amendment because the search or seizure complained of was directed at
him, even though the execution of the search or seizure resulted in an alleged violation of
the rights of a third party under the amendment. Although broader in scope than the
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interest under the fourth amendment.
The premises in Jones-the vice of prosecutorial self-contradic
tion, the possibility of defendant self-incrimination, and the posses
sion of the evidence seized as "an acceptable measure of Fourth
Amendment interests"35-no longer remain as a viable foundation
for the rule of automatic standing. Jones has been overruled. 36
In view of the foregoing analysis, it is not necessary for a court,
in attempting to resolve the issue of standing, to conduct "a separate
inquiry" into the issue of standing distinct from the merits of a de
fendant's claim under the fourth amendment. Rather, a court will
focus "directly on the substance of the defendant's claim that he. . .
possessed a 'legitimate expectation of privacy' in the areas
searched."37 Thus, the two inquiries have merged into one: whether
the conduct of the police violated any legitimate expectation of pri
vacy possessed by the accused. 38 Further, the burden of proof rests
upon the accused to demonstrate not only that the search com
plained of was illegal, but also that he had a legitimate expectation
of privacy in the area of the search. 39 Failure to sustain this two
pronged burden will result in the denial of a motion to suppress.
traditional concept of standing, which is premised on an infringement of personal fourth
amendment guarantees, it is more limiting than the doctrine which sanctions standing
whenever the fruits of any unreasonable search or seizure are offered in evidence against
an accused. Under this latter theory, if evidence is obtained in violation of the amend
ment, that alone is determinative of the issue of suppression, and confers standing upon
any criminal defendant against whom the fruits of the violation are proposed to be used.
See People v. Martin, 45 Cal. 2d 755,761,290 P.2d 855,857 (1955) (en banc) (standing
conferred to deter illegal enforcement of the law, not to vindicate personal constitutional
rights); Comment, Standing to Object to an Unreasonable Search and Seizure, 34 U. CHI.
L. REV. 342, 356-58, 361, 365-66 (1967); Note, Standing to Object to an Unlawful Search
and Seizure, 1965 WASH. U.L.Q. 488, 519-20. Moreover, this theory serves to effectively
implement the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule. See Mascolo, supra note 7,
at 4-5.
35. United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 92 (1980).
36. Id. at 85, 93, 95.
37. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128,
133, 138-40 (1978). A defendant's subjective expectation of privacy is not controlling.
His expectation of privacy, to be legitimate, must be objectively reasonable. See id. at
143-44 n.12.
An indepth analysis of Rakas is beyond the scope of this article. For present pur
poses, it is sufficient to note that Rakas rejected the continued labeling of the inquiry, on
a determination of a motion to suppress, as one of standing, which Jones identified as
separate and distinct under the target theory from the merits of a defendant's claim
under the fourth amendment. 362 U.S. at 261,263,265,267. Instead, Rakas endorsed a
shifting of emphasis to the substantive issue of whether the challenged search or seizure
violated the rights of the movant under the fourth amendment. 439 U.S. at 133, 138-40.
38. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 106 (1980).
39. Id. at 104; United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980). This is a stricter
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The expectation of privacy standard recognizes that the rela
tionship between a movant for exclusion and the area searched is
essential to a determination of the privacy interests implicated by a
particular search or seizure; that is, unless the movant can demon
strate a personal privacy interest in the area searched, suppression
will be denied, regardless of the illegality of the police conduct in
volved. 40 Thus, evidence may be excluded only if a search or seizure
has violated the defendant's fourth amendment rights. This question
can be answered only by determining whether "the challenged con
duct [has] invaded [the movant's] legitimate expectation of privacy
rather than that of a third party."41
The descriptive phrase "expectation of privacy" embodies a de
termination of the nexus between the area of a search and the indi
vidual seeking to invoke fourth amendment issues, as well as an
assessment of whether the conduct complained of is a search subject
to constitutional limitations. 42 The nexus between an individual
seeking to invoke the protections of the fourth amendment and the
area of a search is crucial to determining whether he has a legitimate
expectation of privacy in the area of the search. 43 In other words, a
movant for suppression must demonstrate a relationship to the area
searched sufficient to raise objections under the fourth amendment
for the exclusionary rule to be invoked.
Whether an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy
will be assessed in light of the totality of the surrounding circum
stances. Among the factors to be considered in a legitimate expecta
than the legitimate presence rationale of Jones for invoking "the privacy of the
searched." 362 U.S. at 267.
United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731, 735-37 (1980) (refusing to suppress
illegally seized from third party); Comment, Rakas v. Illinois: The End of
Fourth Amendment Standing But Not of Fourth Amendment Confusion, 46 BROOKLYN L.
REV. 123, 140 n.92 (1979). See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142-43, 148-49 (1978).
This position clearly is inconsistent with the deterrence rationale of the exclusionary rule.
E.g., United Statesv. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347-48 (1974); Elkins v. United States, 364
U.S. 206, 217 (1960). It would appear, that the unwillingness of the Supreme Court to
expand the scope of the exclusionary rule reflects a certain discontent with the rule itself.
For an analysis of the positive impact upon deterrence of the target theory of standing,
see White & Greenspan, Standing to Object to Search and Seizure, 1I8 U. PA. L. REV.
333, 349-56 (1970).
41. United States v. Payner, 447 U.S. 727, 731 (1980) (emphasis in original).
42. Williamson, Fourth Amendment Standing and Expectations of Privacy: Rakas
v. Illinois and New Directions/or Some Old Concepts, 31 U. FLA. L. REV. 831, 845-46
(1979).
43. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); UnitedStates v. Payner,
447 U.S. 727, 731, 735-37 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 140, 142-43, 144 n.12,
standard
premises
40.
evidence
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tion of privacy determination are the use made of the premises, the
normal precautions taken to maintain privacy, the property interests
of the objecting party in the area of the search, and whether the in
trusion at issue would have been objectionable to the framers of the
fourth amendment. 44 Although legitimate presence on the premises
is relevant to this analysis, it is not controlling. 45 Moreover, a pro
prietary or possessory relationship to the area of a search also is rele
vant46 because "property rights reflect society's explicit recognition
of a person's authority to act as he wishes in certain areas. . . ."47
Ultimately, the determinative factor will be a demonstrated privacy
interest in the invaded place, with consideration of property concepts
in assessing the legitimacy of expectations of privacy under the
fourth amendment. 48
III.

STEAGALD

In Payton v. New York ,49 the Supreme Court held that a war
rantless entry into the home of a suspect to execute a warrantless
felony arrest is unreasonable under the fourth amendment in the ab
sence of either consent or exigent circumstances. 50 The Court rea
soned that both an arrest and a search effect a breach of the entrance
to the home, and that "any differences in the intrusiveness [of either
type of entry] are merely ones of degree rather than kind."51 Hence,
both an arrest and a search implicate the same privacy interests and
44. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 152-53 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring). It has been
noted that "Rakas has defined the scope of access to fourth amendment protection. . .
as being intimately related to the interpretation accorded the substantive right." Note,.
Rakas v. Illinois: The Fourth Amendment and Standing Revisited, 40 LA. L. REV. 962, 972
(1980). Thus, the narrower the interpretation, the more restrictive the access to the af
forded protection. Id.
45. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 148 (1978).
46. See id. at 144 n.12, 149. For a discussion of the implications of Rakas' limiting
the reach of fourth amendment protections to those individuals with substantial property
interests in the area searched, see Gutterman, Fourth Amendment Privacy and Standing:
"Wherever the Twain Shall Meet," 60 N.C. L. REV. 1 (1981); Mickenberg, Fourth Amend
ment Standing After Rakas v. Illinois: From Property 10 Privacy and Back, 16 N. ENG. L.
REV. 197 (1981); Williamson, supra note 42; Note, Criminal Procedure-The Demise of
Standing 10 Assert Fourth Amendment Violations-United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83
(1980),3 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 527 (1981); Comment, supra note 40.
47. Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 153 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). See Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
48. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 143, 144 n.12 (1978).
49. 445 U.S. 573 (1980).
50. Id. at 576, 589-90.
51. Id. at 589.
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require the authority of a warrant. 52
Although the Court required that an arrest warrant be issued
before the police may enter a suspect's home, the Court refused to
sanction the additional requirement of a search warrant. The Court
conceded that the presence of a search warrant might afford the indi
vidual greater privacy protection than that provided by requiring
only an arrest warrant. 53 The Court, however, determined that the
requirement of an arrest warrant would "suffice to interpose the
magistrate's determination of probable cause between the zealous of
ficer and the citizen."54 Therefore, if the evidence of guilt was suffi
cient to satisfy the standards of probable cause for the issuance of an
arrest warrant, it would be "constitutionally reasonable to require
[the subject of the warrant] to open his doors to the officers of the
law."55 Accordingly, a. valid arrest warrant "implicitly" authorizes
entry into a suspect's residence when the officers executing the war
rant have probable cause to believe that he is within.56
The speciousness of this reasoning, in particular the relevance of
probable cause evidence of guilt to the claim of a breach of the sepa
rate privacy interest in the home,57 was recognized implicitly in Stea
ga/d. 58 In Steaga/d, the Supreme Court refined the Payton analysis
by arguing that because an arrest warrant authorizes the police to
deprive the subject of the warrant of his liberty, "it necessarily also
authorizes a limited invasion of that person's privacy interest when it
is necessary to arrest him in his home."59
In Steaga/d, the Coun addressed an issue left open in Payton:
the need for a search warrant in the routine execution of an arrest
warrant when the suspect sought is in the home of a third party. The
52. Id. at 589-90.
53. Id. at 602.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 602-03.
56. Id. at 603.
57. See Mascolo, Arrest Warrants and Search Warrants: TheSeizureofaSuspectin
the Home ofa Third Party, 54 CONN. B.J. 299, 301-02 (1980).
58. 451 U.S. 204 (1981).
59. Id. at 214 n.7. This, of course, does not justify or clarify the inexplicable rele
vance of probable cause evidence of guilt to probable cause presence in the home, see
note 3 supra, nor does it address the separate privacy interests of other individuals resid
ing in the home of the suspect. For a discussion of the separate privacy interests of these
residents, see Comment, Arresting a Suspect in a Third Party's Home: What is Reason
able?, 72 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 293 (1981). Finally, it fails to explain why a
probable cause determination of situs by police officers poses a lesser risk to privacy
interests in the home of a suspect than it does to those interests in the residence of a third
party.
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Court concluded that there was such a need. 60
The Court began its analysis by reiterating its concern that law
enforcement officers may lack that degree of objectivity required of a
neutral and detached magistrate "to weigh correctly the strength of
the evidence supporting the contemplated action against the individ
ual's interests in protecting his own liberty and the privacy of his
home."61 Moreover, an arrest warrant and a search warrant protect
distinct interests under the fourth amendment, even though they
both serve to subject the probable cause determination of law officers
to judicial review and assessment. The primary function of an arrest
warrant is to protect the individual from an unreasonable seizure by
requiring a magistrate to issue such process only upon a showing
that probable cause exists to believe that the subject sought has com
mitted a criminal offense. 62 In contrast, a search warrant serves to
protect the privacy interest of the individual in his home and posses
sions from the unjustified intrusion of the police by requiring a
showing of probable cause to believe that the legitimate object of a
search is situated in a particular place. 63
Thus, while the presence of an arrest warrant will protect the
subject of the warrant from an unreasonable seizure, it will do noth
ing to protect the privacy interests of a third party in the sanctity of
his home when the police attempt to execute the warrant there on the
basis of their personal determination of probable cause. The Court
held that such judicially "untested determinations" are too unrelia
ble to justify a routine entry into a person's home to search for a
suspect in the absence of a search warrant. 64 The Court observed
that to permit the police, absent exigent circumstances, to decide if
there is sufficient justification to search the home of a third party for
the subject of an arrest warrant creates "a significant potential for
abuse."65 Armed with an arrest warrant for a single person, the po
lice, for example, could "search all the homes of that individual's
friends and acquaintances."66 As the fourth amendment operates to
60. 451 U.S. at 222.
61. Id. at 212. See also, Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 586 n.24 (1980);
Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385, 395 (1978); Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443,
449-51 (1971) (plurality opinion); Jones v. United States, 357 U.S. 493, 498 (1958); Mc
Donald v. United States, 335 U.S. 451, 455-56 (1948); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S.
10, 13-14 (1948).
62. 451 U.S. at 212.
63. Id. at 212-13.
64. Id. at 213.
65. Id. at 215.
66. Id.
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prevent, not simply to redress, unlawful action by the police, it man
dates the participation of a neutral and detached magistrate in the
probable cause determination as "an essential element of a reason
able search or seizure. . . ."67 The Court reasoned that absent a
particularized judicial determination that the subject is present in the
home of a third party, the search is as unreasonable from the home
owner's perspective as a search conducted in the absence of
warrant. 68
Finally, the Court addressed the interests implicated in Payton.
The Court stated that when an individual is the subject of an arrest
warrant, his interest in being free from an unreasonable entry into
his home is subordinate to the authority conferred by the arrest war
rant to deprive the subject of his freedom: This authority necessarily
sanctions a limited invasion of the subject's privacy interest in the
execution of the warrant process. 69 This reasoning, however, is inap
plicable when an arrest warrant is executed in the residence of a
third party. The Court emphasized that in the latter situation the
warrant "embodies no judicial determination whatsoever regarding
the person whose home is to be searched."70 Because the arrest war
rant does not authorize the police to deprive the third-party home
owner of his liberty, it may not be used to deprive him of his privacy
interest in his home. Absent exigent circumstances or valid consent,
such an interest only can be deprived by a magistrate upon an ade
quate showing that the object of the search is located in the third
party's home. 7)
By demonstrating the distinct privacy interests protected respec
tively by arrest and search warrants, Steagald served to dichotomize
the legitimate expectations of privacy of the subject of an arrest war
rant from those of a third-party homeowner. As to the former, he
seeks protection from an unreasonable seizure. As to the latter, he
seeks protection from unjustified intrusions into the privacy of his
home and his possessions. These respective interests are mutually
exclusive. Therefore, the respective expectations of privacy are
equally exclusive, with the derivative result that each is irrelevant to
the other. This, in tum, will prevent either the subject of an arrest
warrant or the owner of a residence where the subject is appre
67. Id. at 216. See United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 347 (1974); Elkins v.
United States, 364 U.S. 206, 217 (1960).
68. 451 U.S. at 216.
69. Id. at 214 n.7.
70. Id.
71. /d.
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hended from complaining about unreasonable governmental intru
sions upon the privacy interests of the other. 72
IV.

THE SEPARATE PRIVACY INTERESTS IN THE THIRD-PARTY
RESIDENCE

A fundamental fourth amendment principle is that the individ
ual's "'legitimate expectations of privacy' "73 from unreasonable
searches or seizures are most pronounced in the home. 74 To secure
these interests, the framers of the fourth amendment erected certain
barriers to forcible and warrantless entries by government officers
into the home. 75 Chief among these barriers is the requirement of a
warrant. 76 Accordingly, and in furtherance of this broadly perceived
requirement, the execution of an arrest warrant for a suspect in the
home of a third party requires the authority of a search warrant to
secure the privacy concerns of the homeowner. 77 These privacy in
terests, however, are personal to the homeowner and may not be as
serted vicariously by those for whom the privacy expectations are
not justified. 7s
Wherever an individual may be, he carries with him expecta
tions of privacy with regard to the integrity and dignity of his per
son.79 Thus, he may invoke his fourth amendment right to privacy
wherever he may legitimately anticipate freedom from unwarranted
governmental intrusion.so As these expectations are most pro
nounced in private areas, such as residences,sl when the subject of
72. This separation of interests serves to reinforce the prohibition against the vica
rious assertion of fourth amendment rights. See notes 10-12 & 37-41 supra and accom
panying text.
73. Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91 (1979).
74. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980).
75. See United States v. United States Dist. Court, 407 U.S. 297, 313 (1972); Boyd
v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886); Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth
Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 363 (1974).
76. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980).
77. Steaga1d v. United States, 451 U,S. 204, 213-16 (1981).
78. See id. at 213-14 & n.7; United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1980);
Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34, 142
(1978); United States v. Briones-Garza, 651 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (by implica
tion); United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978).
79. State v. Dias, 52 Hawaii 100, 106,470 P.2d 510, 514 (1970). See Terry v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1,9 (1968).
80. State v. Matias, 51 Hawaii 62,65-66,451 P.2d 257, 259 (1969). See Ybarra v.
Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351-52, 359
(1967).
81. Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 585-90 (1980).
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an arrest warrant enters the home of a third party the protections of
the fourth amendment enter with him.82 His expectations of privacy
in the home, however, may be "separate and distinct" from those of
other individuals, depending upon the degree of legitimacy that at
taches to such interests in the area searched. 83
The privacy concerns of a third party in his home primarily are
those of the third party himself. These include the right to be free
from unreasonable governmental intrusions into his home, posses
sions, and private papers. 84 These interests are separate and distinct
from those of the subject of an arrest warrant, and are not the con
cern of the subject who is in the home of a third party as a casual
visitor or guest. 85 Nor are they those of the subject of an arrest war
rant who resides in the third party's home when the warrant is being
executed for his person. 86 He can have no subjective expectation
that the third-party residence will remain free from governmental
intrusion. 87 The subject is entitled to insist upon the authority of an
arrest warrant to protect him from an unreasonable seizure. 88 Be
yond that, he may not insist. As a casual visitor, guest, or resident,
he receives all the protection he may legitimately expect when he is
apprehended in execution of an arrest warrant in the home of a third
party. In this setting, the execution of an arrest warrant permits a
limited intrusion upon the subject's otherwise legitimate expectations
of privacy.89
Undoubtedly, the subject of an arrest warrant possesses certain
privacy interests in the home of a third party. These interests en
compass the right to be free from an unreasonable seizure 90 and the
freedom to secure the personal integrity of one's papers and effects
from unwarranted governmental encroachment. 91 But these inter
82. See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. I, 9 (1968).
83. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980); Ybarra v. Illinois, 444
U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979).
84. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981); Boyd v. United States,
116 U.S. 616, 624-30 (1886).
85. See Ybarra v. Illinois, 444 U.S. 85, 91-92 (1979); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 142 (1978); id. at 153 (Powell, J., concurring). For example, the homeowner pos
sesses a separate right to exclude others, which itself confers upon him a legitimate ex
pectation of privacy, and constitutes one of the fundamental rights attaching to property.
Id. at 143-44 & n.12.
86. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
87. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 105 (1980).
88. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
89. See id. at 214 n.7; Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
90. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213 (1981).
91. See Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 n.ll (1978).
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ests are secured fully by the presence of an arrest warrant, which
protects the individual from an unreasonable seizure and limits the
scope of the intrusion to the areas of the residence where the subject
may be 10cated.92 It will not sanction a rummaging among his pa
pers and effects. The scope of a properly conducted incidental
search and plain view seizure will be limited, respectively, to the per
son of the arrestee, the area within his immediate reach,93 and the
area that is in open view while the police are conducting a properly
limited quest for the subject or incidental search. 94
In the typical situation, it is only the third-party homeowner
who has a legitimate expectation. of privacy in his own residence suf
ficient to invoke the protection of a search warrant. 95 The subject of
an arrest warrant, however, may not vicariously assert the security of
such protection. 96 Thus, in order to invoke the protection of the
fourth amendment, an accused must establish that he had a legiti
mate expectation of privacy in the area of an illegal search or
seizure. 97 Even if an accused can demonstrate the existence of such
a privacy interest in the premises of a third party,98 he may not
thereby invoke a protection that exceeds the privacy ambit attaching
to him in his own home. It is in precisely such a setting that Payton
taught the lack of a need for a search warrant. 99
Steagald "[rested] on a very special set of facts. . . ."100 If the
subject of an arrest warrant resides in a particular dwelling for a
significant period of time, it will be considered his home for purposes
of the fourth amendment. 101 This will be so even if it is the residence
of a third party, others are living there, "and ... the suspect concur
92. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 518 (1971) (White, J., concurring &
dissenting); United States v. Ford, 553 F.2d 146, 159 n.45 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (dictum).
93. Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 762-63 (1969).
94. Coolidge v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 465 & n.24 (1971) (plurality
opinion).
95. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14 & n.7 (1981); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 142 (1978).
96. United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951, 955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concurring), cert.
denied, 439 U.S. 967 (1978). See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 86-87 (1980);
Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128, 133-34 (1978); Groot, Arrests in Private Dwellings, 67 VA.
L. REV. 275, 284 n.44 (1981).
97. Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98, 104-06 (1980).
98. See United States v. Salvucci, 448 U.S. 83, 95 (1980); Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S.
128, 142-43 (1978); Combs v. United States, 408 U.S. 224,227-28 (1972) (per curiam).
99. 445 U.S. at 602. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 230-31 (1981)
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Note, Criminal Law-Search and Seizure: Fourth Amendment
Limitations on Warrantless Entries to Arrest, 46 Mo. L. REV. 423, 437 (1981).
100. 451 U.S. at 230 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
101. Id. at 230-31.
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rently maintains a residence elsewhere as well."102 In this situation,
the police may enter the premises with only an arrest warrant. 103 On
the other hand, if the subject is a mere transient visitor or guest in
the residence of a third party, he may not invoke the privacy inter
ests of his host so as to require the additional authority and protec
tion of a search warrant. 104 The more fleeting his connection with
the premises, "the more likely that exigent circumstances will exist
justifying immediate police action without departing to obtain a
search warrant." 105
Surely, the subject's expectations of privacy in the home of the
third party cannot exceed those in his own residence where he may
not demand the additional protection of a search warrant. More
over, as Steagald held, the protection to which the subject is entitled
under the fourth amendment-the authority of an arrest warrant-is
that which he is receiving. 106 The presence of the warrant secures
him from an unreasonable seizure and is the essence of the privacy
protection to which he is entitled under the amendment.

v.

CONCLUSION

In Steagald v. United States, 107 the Supreme Court required that
a search warrant be issued before an arrest warrant could be exe
cuted in a third party's home. The requirement of a search warrant
for the execution of an arrest warrant in the home of a third party
secures to the homeowner the protection of his legitimate expecta
tions of privacy in his residence. These are separate and distinct
from the privacy concerns of the suspect, which are protected by the
102. Id. at 231.
103. Id. at 230-31. See Payton v. New York, 445 U.S. 573, 602-03 (1980).
104. See Steagald v. United States, 451 U.S. 204, 213-14 & n.7 (1981); Rakas v.
Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978); Lee v. Gilstrop, 661 F.2d 999, 1000 (4th Cir. 1981) (per
curiam); United States v. Meyer, 656 F.2d 979, 981-82 (5th Cir. 1981) (transient visitor
lacked requisite expectation of privacy to insist upon presence of search warrant for resi
dent's apartment); United States v. Boyer, 574 F.2d 951,955 (8th Cir.) (Ross, J., concur
ring), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 976 (1978); People v. Ponder, 54 N.Y.2d 160,445 N.Y.S.2d
57,429 N.E.2d 735 (1981); Note, supra note 99, at 437-38; if. United States v. Clifford,
664 F.2d 1090, 1093 (8th Cir. 1981) (arrestee's legitimate expectation of privacy in third
party's home not crucial; Payton sanctions presence of only an arrest warrant for home
owner himself, and arrestee-guest can claim no greater protection); United States v.
Briones-Garza, 651 F.2d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1981) (questionable whether guard at "drop
house" for illegal aliens had standing to object to absence of search warrant in the execu
tion of an arrest warrant for a third party; vacated and remanded for hearing on issue).
105. 451 U.S. at 231 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
106. Id. at 214 n.7.
107. Id. at 204.

396

WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 4:381

presence of the arrest warrant. Further, the suspect may not vicari
ously invoke the privacy interests of a third party under the fourth
amendment and is entitled only to the same privacy expectations in
the home of the third party that are secured to him in his own resi
dence. Although Steagald did not address the question whether the
subject of an arrest warrant has the right to the privacy protection of
a search warrant, the presence of the arrest warrant secures him from
an unreasonable seizure. The courts should not require a search
warrant in the event that a claim of exigent circumstances is rejected.

